

Assessing de facto independence of NRAs and the accountability puzzle

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NRA's Independence



A regulator is independent if it has within the governance structure a position that ensures that the regulator performs the decision-making process meeting the normative requirements for which the independence of the regulator is called for. (INDIREG study)

For independence to lead to better policy outcomes, a complex causal chain needs to operate, leading from statutory provisions granting independence to behavioral patterns demonstrating independence, to policy decisions, and, ultimately, to policy outcomes.

(Hanretty and Koop 2012)

De facto independence

INDIREG

- Formal independence alone cannot explain the variation of de facto independence
- Defining features:
 - the implementation of normative rules on formal independence
 - the delegation of relevant powers as well as organizational autonomy
 - the absence of undue external influence on the regulator
- To some extent it's an acquired property that needs time to build



How to measure de facto independence INDIREG

- Qualitative social science research methods
 - Expert surveys and interviews
 - Peer review (other regulators/ regulatees/ academics)
 - Ex post impact assessments
 - Econometric analysis of goal conflicts
 - Media content analysis (proxy)

Problems


- How to come to terms with informal means of influence?
- What are objective benchmarks of regulatory capture?
- How to account for voluntary compliance with political preferences?

How to measure de facto independence

- Indicators of de facto independence
 - Turnover of members of the decision making body
 - Post-electoral vulnerabilities
 - Appointment politicization
 - Revolving door appointments
 - Age of the regulator
 - Substantial delegated powers
 - Reversed decision of the NRA
 - Impact on the market
 - Respect for accountability standards


Composite index

INDIREG Ranking Tool



How to measure de facto independence INDIREG

- Mixed method approach:
 - Combining indicators with interpretative analyses that is informed by empirical research (qualitative)





- Absolute independence bears the risk that the regulator strays from its mandate, acts unpredictable or becomes grossly inefficient
- Accountability and transparency mechanisms serve as safeguards here
- Empirical links between formal independence, accountability and perceived quality: All three positively related to each other

A sustainable and fruitful trade-off between independence and accountability is possible" without detriment to the regulator's perceived quality

(Hanretty, Larouche, and Reindl 2012)



- INDIREG multi-stakeholder survey (=93)
- Significant correlations between transparency/ accountability and impartial regulation
 - Transparency of the regulatory body (-/+)
 - Accessibility of decisions of the regulatory body (+)
 - Announcement and conduct of public consultation in an inclusive fashion (+)
 - Awareness among the stakeholders of strong compliance (+/-)

INDIREG indicators

- 34. Legal obligation to publish decisions
- 35. Legal obligation to justify decisions
- 36. Legal requirement to organize consultations
- 37. Nature of the consultations (open or closed)
- 38. Legal reporting obligations
- 39. Legal mechanism of ex-post control by a democratically elected body
- 40. Right of appeal against decisions
- 41. Accepted grounds for appeal
- 42. Legal requirement on external audit of the financial situation



- 25. Proactive publication of decisions together with motivations
- 26. Publication outlet

Accountability and transparency

- 27. Organization of consultations
- 28. Nature of consultations organized (open or closed)
- 29. Publication of responses to consultation
- 30. Explanation to which extent responses are taken into account
- 31. Publication of periodical activity reports
- 32. Assessment or control by a democratically elected body
- 33. Incidents of the activity report (or other forms of approval) being refused
- 34. Decisions of the regulatory body having been overturned by a court/administrative tribunal in a significant number of cases
- 35. Periodic external financial auditing
- 36. Revelation of serious financial malpractices during any audit



Like beauty; accountability is in the eyes of the beholder

- Self-assessment only partially suitable
- But self-optimization of accountability practices
 - Best practices of public consultations, pro-active transparency, inclusiveness ...
 - End-to-end good governance practices (policy cycle)

